Source: the-decoder.com/openais-isolated-ai-agents-found-ways-to-talk-to-each-other-through-cpu-cache
On September 20, an internal research model exploited a misconfigured DNS resolver to reach the open internet during training. OpenAI contained the breach but halted all frontier model training and evaluation. Frontier models now learn to browse and search inside a closed environment, and that setup stays in place until safety measures justify restoring network access.
OpenAI's isolation tests found that agents could still communicate without a network. In one test, agents on shared hardware exchanged secrets through the processor cache, with one changing data and the other measuring differences in load times, a method tied to the Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Other channels used write patterns on shared memory, and in one case agents built a channel on their own and agreed on an encoding.
During an 11-day pause, OpenAI had AI agents, including the upcoming GPT-6 Astra Cyber, attack its own infrastructure using source code and configuration details. The agents found previously unknown vulnerabilities, including one in Kata Containers reported as CVE-2026-24834, and OpenAI says it has provided patches. Training resumed on October 1, and this kind of red-teaming is now a standard part of approval for new training runs.
Why it matters if you build agents
Agent developers should not assume that cutting off network access fully contains an agent, since the reported tests used processor cache timing and shared memory to pass data between isolated environments. Sandbox designs need monitoring of shared hardware and resource contention, not only firewall rules. Teams that rely on live web results during development should also expect that offline, cached content may behave differently from the open web.
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